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Abstract
Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity. These
two forms of inequity aversion follow different developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion
emerging around 4 years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity aversion is
assumed to be specific to situations where resources are distributed among individuals, the role of social context has not
been tested in children. Here, we investigated the influence of two aspects of social context on inequity aversion in 4- to 9-
year-old children: (1) the role of the experimenter distributing rewards and (2) the presence of a peer with whom rewards
could be shared. Experiment 1 showed that children rejected inequity at the same rate, regardless of whether the
experimenter had control over reward allocations. This indicates that children’s decisions are based upon reward allocations
between themselves and a peer and are not attempts to elicit more favorable distributions from the experimenter.
Experiment 2 compared rejections of unequal reward allocations in children interacting with or without a peer partner.
When faced with a disadvantageous distribution, children frequently rejected a smaller reward when a larger reward was
visible, even if no partner would obtain the larger reward. This suggests that nonsocial factors partly explain
disadvantageous inequity rejections. However, rejections of disadvantageous distributions were higher when the larger
amount would go to a peer, indicating that social context enhances disadvantageous inequity aversion. By contrast,
children rejected advantageous distributions almost exclusively in the social context. Therefore, advantageous inequity
aversion appears to be genuinely social, highlighting its potential relevance for the development of fairness concerns. By
comparing social and nonsocial factors, this study provides a detailed picture of the expression of inequity aversion in
human ontogeny and raises questions about the function and evolution of inequity aversion in humans.
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Introduction
The occurrence of extensive cooperation in human societies
creates numerous opportunities for exploitation by free riders [1–
3]. In order to avoid being exploited, individuals must regulate
their contributions to cooperative endeavors by attending to their
payoffs relative to those of social partners. In line with this
reasoning, human adults show a strong aversion to inequitable
payoff distributions, i.e. they sacrifice personal gain in order to
avoid inequity [4]. For example, in the ultimatum game, people
often reject allocations of resources that place them at a
disadvantage relative to a partner (i.e. disadvantageous inequity),
preferring nothing to a small relative reward [5]. This behavior
violates rational choice models that predict that people should
accept any non-zero offer of a desirable resource [6]. More
surprisingly, in some situations adults also reject advantageous
allocations in which they receive more than a peer (advantageous
inequity) [4,7–8]. Despite some variation, an aversion to unequal
resource distributions has been established in a wide variety of
cultural communities [9–11], demonstrating the apparent ubiquity
of inequity aversion across human populations.
Research on children and nonhuman animals demonstrates that
inequity aversion is not restricted to human adults. Studies of
children show that sensitivity to inequity is an important feature of
early development [12–13] and point to an intriguing asymmetry
in the development of children’s aversion to disadvantageous and
advantageous inequity. Recent studies have found that children as
young as 3 years of age develop an aversion to disadvantageous
inequity [14–17] but do not develop an aversion to advantageous
inequity until later, around 8 years of age [14,18]. In addition to
developmental studies, experiments on nonhuman animals have
raised the question of whether inequity aversion is unique to
humans and have demonstrated that some nonhuman animals are
sensitive to disadvantageous resource distributions [19–30]. These
studies suggest that an aversion to disadvantageous inequity may
have deep evolutionary roots. As yet, however, no study has
directly tested advantageous inequity aversion in nonhumans and
thus there is currently no evidence that nonhuman animals are
averse to advantageously unequal allocations (see Brosnan et al.,
2010 [30] for an indirect test of advantageous inequity aversion in
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes). Together, results from studies of
children and nonhuman animals suggest that separate evolution-
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ary and developmental mechanisms underlie the two forms of
inequity aversion.
Empirical demonstrations of inequity aversion across adults,
children and nonhuman animals raise the question of how
inequity aversion could have evolved, given that it motivates
individuals to sacrifice personal gain. Theories to explain the
evolution and expression of inequity aversion can be broadly
grouped under two hypotheses. First, the Social Hypothesis [4,31–
32] suggests that inequity aversion is specific to the social domain
and evolved as a means of regulating contributions to, and payoffs
from, cooperative interactions. According to this hypothesis an
aversion to inequity allows individuals to ensure that they are not
contributing more or less to cooperative activities than fellow
cooperators and thus protects individuals from being exploited and
from exploiting others. Second, the Nonsocial Hypothesis suggests
that inequity aversion is a result of domain-general mechanisms
such as reference dependence and loss aversion that allows
individuals to gauge their own payoffs relative to expected payoffs
[33–35]. According to the Nonsocial Hypothesis, inequity aversion
may operate in social interactions but did not necessarily evolve for
social interactions per se. Sensitivity to lower-than-expected
payoffs may indeed be useful even in non-cooperative contexts.
For example, an attention to how one’s payoffs compare to
available payoffs, including those of conspecifics, could confer a
benefit in a foraging context where individuals can alter foraging
strategies based on information about what payoffs can be
expected in a given environment [33].
The Social and Nonsocial hypotheses generate different
predictions. First, according to the Social Hypothesis, rejections
of unequal allocations should occur only when resources are
divided between social partners. Furthermore, individuals should
only reject unequal allocations when their rejections affect their
partner’s payoff and not when their partner’s payoff is fixed
relative to their own. According to the Nonsocial Hypothesis,
rejections of unequal allocations can occur even when there is no
social partner. However, they should occur only in disadvanta-
geous situations (i.e. small rewards will be less desirable when a
larger possible reward is present for comparison) and not in
advantageous situations where one’s payoff is already better than
other available payoffs.
Distinguishing these hypotheses is critical to determining why
humans show inequity aversion and to understanding the
relationship between inequity aversion and fairness. Additionally,
testing nonsocial influences on inequity aversion can shed light on
the processes supporting the human aversion to disadvantageous
and advantageous inequality. If disadvantageous inequity aversion
is specifically social, then it is most likely linked to fairness concerns
(i.e., it is not fair that I have less than someone else) and may thus
have evolved for cooperation. However, if disadvantageous
inequity aversion is a nonsocial response then it may not be
tightly linked to fairness and may instead be related to maximizing
personal rewards relative to available rewards. By contrast,
advantageous inequity aversion should be specifically social and,
as such, may represent a strong concern for fairness.
Only one study of inequity aversion in humans has directly
compared a social with a nonsocial condition in a human
allocation game. Sanfey et al. [36] found that rejections in the
ultimatum game were higher when disadvantageous unequal offers
were made by a human partner compared to a nonsocial condition
where similar ‘offers’ were made by a computer. Notably,
however, individuals also rejected many unequal offers made by
the computer, even though no human partner would have
received the better deal if the offer had been accepted. Thus,
rejections of inequitable offers were stronger in a social context,
suggesting that social influences play an important role in the
expression of inequity aversion in human adults. However, results
from Sanfey et al [36] demonstrate that inequity aversion in
human adults is not necessarily restricted to situations where
participants are interacting with a partner.
In contrast to studies of human adults, studies of inequity
aversion in nonhuman animals have carefully examined the
degree to which inequity aversion is specific to the social domain.
Indeed, this issue has been discussed extensively because it is
essential for the broader question of whether nonhuman primates
demonstrate inequity aversion and, if so, whether animal inequity
aversion is comparable to that of humans [19,25,31–32,37]. One
frequently cited experiment provides a useful example that is
representative of the majority of animal inequity aversion tasks. In
the first study of inequity aversion in a nonhuman species, Brosnan
and de Waal [19] gave pairs of female capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) equal payoffs or unequal payoffs in return for trading a
token. Results showed that participants were least likely to trade a
token when their partner received a high value reward for free
while they had to trade a token for a low value food item.
However, participants also showed high refusals in a nonsocial
condition, where high value food was placed in an adjacent cage
and they were given the option to trade for a low value item. The
fact that participants refused trading opportunities in a nonsocial
condition showed that while inequity aversion might be moderated
by social context, it was not specific to the social context.
Furthermore, offers were produced by a third party (i.e. the
experimenter) and rejections did not actually affect the social
partner’s payoff [37]. Given this, participants may have used
rejections to elicit more favorable distributions from the experi-
menter.
As illustrated in the example above, Brosnan and de Waal’s [19]
study and several similar nonhuman animal studies of inequity
aversion have failed to provide strong support for the Social
Hypothesis for two reasons. First, rejections of unequal offers are
found regularly in nonsocial contexts [19–21,24–26]. Second,
animal tasks are typically designed such that recipients receive
their payoffs regardless of the deciders’ decision [19–27,37]. Thus,
it is unclear why deciders would reject unequal offers given that,
unlike human studies of inequity aversion, rejections do not affect
the overall payoff distribution. One possibility is that rejections are
simply a means of influencing the distributer (i.e. the experimenter)
that participants desire a better reward.
Results from nonhuman animal studies raise important
methodological concerns for the study of inequity aversion in
humans. Manipulations of the social context and of the role of the
experimenter are essential for understanding the mechanisms that
underlie rejections of personal gain in reaction to inequity. Indeed,
manipulations of this kind are critical to testing the Social and
Nonsocial hypotheses for the evolution of inequity aversion.
Taken together, results from animal inequity aversion studies
and from Sanfey et al (2003) [36] suggest that nonsocial factors
may influence the expression of disadvantageous inequity aversion
in humans and nonhuman species. What is currently unknown,
however, is the extent to which the nonsocial dimension of
inequity aversion is present in childhood. Furthermore, to
understand whether social context differentially affects the
expression of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous
inequity, it is essential to investigate the role of social influences
on inequity aversion in a situation where these two processes are
separable. Accordingly, we studied the role of social influences in
the development of disadvantageous and advantageous inequity
aversion in children, where an aversion to these two types of
inequity follow different development trajectories.
Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
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To examine social influences on inequity aversion, we used a
previously validated task: the Inequity Game [14]. The Inequity
Game is a face-to-face task in which children are partnered with
an unfamiliar peer. One child (the decider) decides whether to
accept or reject allocations of candy, which are distributed by an
experimenter. The decider’s decisions determine both their own
and their partner’s payoffs. If a decider accepts an allocation, both
children receive their respective payoffs. If a decider rejects an
allocation, neither child receives any rewards.
The current study consists of two experiments. Experiment 1
asks whether children reject unequal reward allocations in an
effort to solicit more favorable allocations from the experimenter.
According to the Social Hypothesis, children reject inequity in
order to deprive a partner of advantageous or disadvantageous
payoffs. This assumes that the main social interaction in the
Inequity Game is between the decider and his or her partner.
Alternatively, the main social interaction in the Inequity Game
may be independent of the partner’s presence and may instead be
between the decider and the experimenter. In this scenario,
rejections of unequal allocations may be an attempt to influence
the experimenter’s allocation decisions. If this is the case, deciders
should reject unequal allocations more frequently when the
experimenter deliberately generates inequitable divisions of
resources compared to when inequality is randomly generated.
On the other hand, if children’s rejections are not intended to
influence the experimenter, their frequency should not be affected
by whether offers are made deliberately or randomly.
Experiment 2 provides a direct test of the Social Hypothesis by
testing children using a nonsocial variation of the Inequity Game
in which there is no recipient. If inequity aversion in children is a
specifically social phenomenon, we expect few, if any, rejections in
the nonsocial version of the game regardless of whether it involves
advantageous or disadvantageous inequity. However, if the
Nonsocial Hypothesis is true, children should continue to reject
disadvantageous allocations in the same pattern as they did in the
original, social version of the Inequity Game.
General Method
Inequity Game
The method used in these studies closely follows that described
in Blake and McAuliffe, 2011 [14]. In the original Inequity Game
two children sat face-to-face and were assigned one of two roles.
One child (‘‘decider’’) controlled a pair of handles, which were
used to make decisions, while the other child (the ‘‘partner’’ or
‘‘recipient’’) sat across from the decider and could not reach the
handles. The experimenter placed allocations of SkittlesH on both
sides of the apparatus (Fig. 1), always placing the candies on the
recipient’s side first in order to ensure that the decider paid
attention to the recipient’s payoff before perceiving their own.
Before starting the game the experimenter demonstrated how
the handles work: the decider could accept the allocation by
pulling the green handle which tilted the trays outwards, causing
Skittles to fall into bowls on each side of the apparatus. The
decider could reject the allocation by pulling the red handle, which
caused the trays to tip inwards, causing Skittles to fall into the
middle bowl, where neither child was able to obtain them.
Participants were told that any Skittles that fell into their bowls
could be taken home at the end of the game but that neither they
nor their partner would take home the Skittles in the middle bowl.
Children were asked to move Skittles into two side bowls, located
beside the apparatus, so that they could track the candies
accumulating in each other’s bowls. Each side bowl was clearly
associated with one of the participants. After the game was
explained in this way, the participants were given practice trials to
ensure that they understood the apparatus, including the effects of
pulling both handles. The practice trials were as follows: 1–1 (one
for decider, one for recipient); 0–1 (disadvantageous inequity; none
for decider, one for recipient) and 1–0 (advantageous inequity; one
for decider, none for recipient). If a participant accepted all warm-
up trials, they were given an extra 1–1 trial and asked to try the
red handle. Children were not instructed to stay silent during the
game. Participants’ parents were in the vicinity of the testing area
and could watch the game but could not interfere (sessions were
excluded in the case of parental interference, see below).
Design
Participants for Experiments 1 and 2 were recruited in public
parks around Boston between July 2009 and August 2010.
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to experiment.
Analyses
All statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical software
(version 2.15.2) [38]. Decision data were analyzed using Gener-
alized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) with a binary response
term (accept or reject) [39]. Mixed models were run using the
package ‘lme4’ [40]. In all models participant identity (ID) was fit
as a random effect to control for repeated measures.
Our GLMM procedure was as follows: (1) we examined a null
model, which included participant ID as the only explanatory
variable to test how much variation in the response term could be
accounted for by individual variation; (2) we created a full model,
which included predictor variables and all two-way interactions
between Distribution (equal vs. unequal) and the other predictor
variables (see Table 1 for a description of predictor variables); (3)
the full model was compared to the null model using a likelihood
ratio test (LRT) to test whether the inclusion of predictors
provided a better fit to the data than participant ID alone. Unless
otherwise noted, full models provided a better fit to data than null
models; (4) a minimal model was created from the full model by
sequentially dropping single terms from the model and testing
whether their inclusion improved the model fit using likelihood
ratio tests.
To examine whether children’s decision varied over test trials,
we used Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Results from trial analyses
were not significant unless reported. All tests were two-tailed and
alpha was set at 0.05. Figures show raw data and were created
using the ‘ggplot2’ package [41]. Binomial confidence intervals
were calculated using the Agresti-Coull method [42].
Ethics
This study was approved by Harvard University’s Committee
on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. Guardians of
participants gave informed consent in writing before children
participated in the study.
Experiment 1: Are Children Attempting To Influence The
Experimenter?
We tested whether children were more likely to accept unfair
offers that were not under the experimenter’s control compared to
those that were under the experimenter’s control. To this end, we
performed the Inequity Game with a decider and a partner sitting
face-to-face and we manipulated the origin of the offers such that
half of the trial distributions were deliberately determined by the
experimenter (hereafter, ‘‘deliberate’’ offers) while the other half of
trial distributions were randomly determined by cards (hereafter,
‘‘random’’ offers) that had different distributions printed on them
(see Fig. S1 for an illustration of cards).
Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
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Methods
Participants. Children aged 4–9 were recruited in public
parks in the Boston area. Parents were approached and asked if
their child would be interested in participating in a game where
she/he gets to take home candy. If parents consented, children
were escorted to a testing area containing the Inequity Game test
apparatus. We tested a total of 124 pairs (decider age range 4;0–
9;9, 59 female deciders). Participant information for Experiment 1
is reported in Table S1. An additional 16 participants were tested
but excluded due to experimenter error (13), parental interference
(2) or discomfort (1).
Design. Children were assigned to one of two conditions:
disadvantageous inequity (N= 64, 26 female deciders) or advan-
tageous inequity (N= 60, 33 female deciders). Allocation origin
(deliberate or random) and distribution (equal or unequal) were
tested within participants, and inequity type (advantageous or
disadvantageous) was a between-subject factor. This meant that
each pair of children received three deliberate equal allocations
(1–1), three deliberate unequal allocations (either disadvantageous,
1–4, or, advantageous, 4–1), three random equal allocations (1–1)
and three random unequal allocations (either disadvantageous, 1–
4, or, advantageous, 4–1). Allocation origin was blocked so that
pairs received six random allocations followed by six deliberate
allocations or vice versa, with equal and unequal trials randomized
within block.
Procedure. Before administering the randomly generated
allocations, the experimenter showed the participants the cards
and explained how they determined the distribution. The decider
was then asked two questions to make sure she/he understood that
the allocations were not under the experimenter’s control. First,
the experimenter asked the child ‘‘Do you know what the next card will
be?’’ and then ‘‘Do I know what the next card will be?’’ If a participant
did not say ‘‘no’’ to these two questions, the experimenter stated
that the distribution would be a surprise for everyone. The
majority of children spontaneously answered these questions
correctly. However, 24 children did not (17 children in disadvan-
tageous inequity; 7 children in advantageous; 19% of total sample).
The pattern of our results held regardless of whether these children
were included in analyses (see Table S5 and Fig. S4). On each
random allocation trial, the experimenter revealed the card to the
child and distributed Skittles in accordance with the depicted
allocation.
If parents consented, we videotaped sessions (93% of sessions).
Data were analyzed from video coding for these sessions (115 out
of 124) and from live coding for the non-recorded sessions (9
sessions).
Figure 1. Photograph of apparatus used in these studies. Deciders sat on the left side of the apparatus and could operate the handles while
the partner (if present) sat on the right side of the apparatus. Pulling the green handle caused the trays to tip outwards, delivering candies to the two
outside bowls (‘‘accepting an offer’’). Pulling the red handle caused the trays to tip inwards, delivering candy to the inside bowl (‘‘rejecting an offer’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966.g001
Table 1. Description of predictor variables used in analyses of children’s decisions to accept or reject reward allocations in
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Condition Fixed effect with two levels: disadvantageous inequity, advantageous inequity
Distribution Fixed effect with two levels: equal (1–1), unequal (disadvantageous inequity: 1–4 or advantageous inequity: 4–1)
Age group Fixed effect with three levels: 4&5, 6&7, 8&9
Decider gender Fixed effect with two levels: male, female
Origin1 Fixed effect with two levels: deliberate, random
Order1 Fixed effect with two levels: deliberate block first, random block first
Order2 Fixed effect with two levels: equal block first, unequal block first
1Variable is unique to Experiment 1.
2Variable is unique to Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966.t001
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Results
Results from Experiment 1 are shown in Fig. 2a and 2b. This
figure illustrates that children responded differently to the two
types of inequality, rejecting more allocations in the disadvanta-
geous inequity condition than in the advantageous inequity
condition. In contrast, their rejections of equal allocations were
similar across both conditions. This observed interaction between
Distribution (equal vs. unequal) and Condition (disadvantageous
inequity vs. advantageous inequity) was a significant predictor of
children’s decisions in our minimal model (LRT, X21 = 123.97, P
, 0.001). Because participants’ decisions about reward allocations
differed between conditions, all subsequent analyses were
conducted separately for disadvantageous and advantageous
inequity.
Results from the disadvantageous inequity condition are shown
in Fig. 2a. The main question motivating our analysis was whether
children were more likely to reject disadvantageous, unequal
allocations that were deliberately, as opposed to randomly,
generated. As Fig.2a shows, children did not distinguish between
these two allocation origins. A full GLMM of children’s decisions
in the disadvantageous inequity condition showed that the
interaction between Origin and Distribution was not significant
(LRT, X21 = 2.45, P = 0.118). We thus dropped this interaction
from the model when creating the minimal model and additionally
asked whether there was a main effect of Origin. This factor was
not a significant predictor of children’s decisions (LRT, X21 =
0.23, P = 0.635). Given that the origin of disadvantageous
inequity allocations did not affect children’s decisions, we
eliminated both the Origin and Order (deliberate or random
block first) terms from our model.
Our minimal model (see Table S2 for model output) showed
that there were two significant predictors of participants’ decisions
Figure 2. Proportion of reward allocations rejected in Experiment 1, in which reward allocations were either generated deliberately
by the experimenter or randomly generated by a deck of cards. Rejections are shown for the disadvantageous inequity condition (A) and the
advantageous inequity condition (B). Participants were assigned either to the disadvantageous inequity condition (N = 64 pairs) or to the
advantageous inequity condition (N = 60 pairs). In the disadvantageous inequity condition, participants received one piece of candy while either one
piece (equal distribution) or four pieces (unequal distribution) were placed on the recipient’s side of the apparatus. In the advantageous inequity
condition, participants received either one piece of candy (equal distribution) or four pieces (unequal distribution) while one piece was placed on the
recipient’s side of the apparatus. In both the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous inequity conditions, participants received three of each
trial type: 1) deliberate equal; 2) random equal; 3) deliberate unequal and 4) random unequal. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966.g002
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in the disadvantageous inequity condition: (1) an interaction
between Distribution and Age group (LRT, X22 = 35.19, P ,
0.001) and (2) an interaction between Distribution and Decider
gender (LRT, X21 = 5.61, P = 0.018). Fig. 2a illustrates the
interaction between Distribution and Age group: older children
were more likely to reject unequal allocations than younger
children but rejections of equal offers did not vary with age. The
interaction between Decider gender and Distribution was due to
the fact that males were slightly more likely to reject equal offers
and slightly less likely to reject unequal offers than girls in the
disadvantageous inequity condition (see Fig. S2 for a depiction of
this interaction).
We examined participants’ decisions in the advantageous
inequity condition following the same steps as outlined above.
As shown in Fig. 2b, children did not distinguish between
deliberately generated allocations and randomly generated allo-
cations. Indeed, GLMMs revealed that neither the interaction
between Origin and Distribution nor the main effect of Origin
were significant predictors of participants’ decisions in the
advantageous inequity condition (X21 = 0.09, P = 0.766, X
2
1
= 0.22, P = 0.638, respectively). Results from our minimal model
showed that the only significant predictor of participants’ decisions
in the advantageous inequity condition was the interaction
between Distribution and Age Group (LRT, X22 = 20.77, P ,
0.001; model output is shown in Table S2). Children across the
three age groups were unlikely to reject equal offers and 4&5- and
6&7-year-olds rarely rejected advantageously unequal offers (see
Fig. 2b). However, 8&9-year-olds tended to reject more unequal
reward allocations than equal allocations.
Discussion
We found that children’s levels of rejections did not differ
between unequal allocations that were deliberately generated by
the experimenter and allocations that were randomly generated by
cards. Regardless of whether the distribution of rewards was
randomly determined or chosen by the experimenter, 4- to 9-year-
old children were likely to reject disadvantageous allocations. This
suggests that children did not reject disadvantageous inequity in
order to elicit more favorable distributions from the experimenter.
Similarly, children in the 8&9-year-old age group rejected more
advantageous allocations than equal allocations, irrespective of
whether the experimenter had control over allocations. This result
is congruent with Blake and McAuliffe (2011) [14] in showing that
advantageous inequity aversion emerges at 8–9 years. Further, our
findings importantly extend previous work by showing that
rejections of advantageous allocations are a response to an
unequal resource distribution between two peers and are not an
attempt to influence the experimenter.
It is possible that children may not have understood the card
manipulation and instead assumed that the experimenter was in
control regardless of how allocations were determined. This seems
unlikely because the majority of children (81%) answered our card
comprehension questions correctly, confirming that they under-
stood that the experimenter did not know what the next allocation
would be. Moreover, the pattern of our results held even when
participants who did not correctly answer comprehension ques-
tions were excluded from analyses. Furthermore, previous work
shows that children between 4 and 9 years of age distinguish
intentional from accidental outcomes and have a basic under-
standing of randomness [43–44]. Therefore, the most plausible
interpretation of our results appears to be that children’s choices
were guided by the allocations themselves and not by knowledge of
whether allocations had been determined by the experimenter or
not.
Findings from Experiment 1 suggest that the main social
interaction in the Inequity Game is between the decider and the
recipient as opposed to between the decider and the experimenter.
This finding is also consistent with the idea that children reject
reward allocations in order to prevent their partner from receiving
a more desirable allocation (disadvantageous inequity) or a less
desirable allocation (advantageous inequity). However, an alter-
native explanation for rejections in the Inequity Game is that
children are opposed to the unequal reward allocations them-
selves. In other words, it is possible that children would reject
unequal allocations regardless of whether or not they were paired
with a social partner.
Understanding whether children are responding to the unequal
allocations themselves or to an unequal division of rewards
between themselves and a partner will help distinguish between
the Social and Nonsocial hypotheses for the expression of inequity
aversion. If children do indeed respond to the unequal allocations
themselves, which is an alternative explanation for disadvanta-
geous, but not advantageous inequity aversion, this result would be
consistent with the Nonsocial Hypothesis. To address this
alternative explanation for rejections of inequity, we conducted a
nonsocial version of the Inequity Game in which children were
faced with unequal outcomes in the absence of a social partner.
Experiment 2: Do Children Reject Inequity in a Nonsocial
Game?
The goal of this experiment was to test whether children’s
rejections of unequal allocations in the Inequity Game are specific
to situations in which deciders are paired with a social partner. To
this end, we conducted the Inequity Game with a decider but no
recipient. We reasoned that if children reject allocations due to an
aversion to the unequal outcomes themselves, then rates of
rejection in Experiment 2 should be indistinguishable from those
observed in Experiment 1. However, if children are importantly
influenced by the presence of a social partner, we should expect to
see a difference in rates of rejections between the two studies.
Methods
Participants and design. We tested a total of 201 children
(107 females). As in Experiment 1, children were assigned to one of
two conditions: disadvantageous inequity (N = 98, 55 females; age
range: 4;0–9;9); and advantageous inequity, N = 103, 52 females;
age range: 4;0–9;8). Participant information for Experiment 2 is
reported in Table S1. An additional five participants were tested
but excluded due to experimenter error (2), session interruption
(1), parental interference (1) or shyness (1).
Children were given 3 warm-up trials and 12 test trials.
Children participated in either the disadvantageous inequity
condition or the advantageous inequity condition (between-subject
factor). In both conditions, the test trials were blocked so that
children received a block of 6 equal trials (1–1, 1 for decider, 1 on
the other tray) and a block of 6 unequal trials (disadvantageous
inequity: 1 for decider, 4 on other tray; advantageous inequity: 4
for decider, 1 on the other tray). Block order was counterbalanced
across participants.
Procedure. Children were recruited in public parks, as
described in Experiment 1. The instructions were the same as
above except that, here, the experimenter said that the Skittles on
the other side of the apparatus would go back into the bag at the
end of the game. To test their understanding of this, children were
asked where the Skittles on the other side of the apparatus would
go at the end of the game. If children failed to spontaneously
answer this question correctly (15 children; 7 children in
disadvantageous inequity and 8 in advantageous inequity; 7.5%
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of total sample), the experimenter would restate that the Skittles
went back in the bag at the end of the game. Excluding children
who did not answer this question correctly did not change the
pattern of our results.
Video recordings were available for 98.5% of participants and
unavailable for three participants for whom we did not have video
consent. Data were analyzed from video coding for all but these
sessions. Data from live coding were analyzed for the three non-
recorded sessions.
Results
Nonsocial Game. Results from Experiment 2 are shown in
Fig. 3a and b. Children responded differently to the two types of
inequality, rejecting more unequal distributions in the disadvan-
tageous inequity condition than in the advantageous inequity
condition. By contrast, their rejections of equal distributions were
similar across both conditions. As in Experiment 1, we found that
the interaction between Condition (disadvantageous vs. advanta-
geous inequity) and Distribution (equal vs. unequal) was a
significant predictor of children’s decisions (LRT, X21 = 74.91,
P , 0.001). Consequently, all subsequent analyses were conducted
separately for disadvantageous and advantageous inequity condi-
tions.
Fig. 3a illustrates children’s probability of rejecting unequal
compared to equal allocations in the disadvantageous inequity
condition. Examination of this figure suggests that children in all
age groups rejected more unequal offers (1–4) than equal offers (1–
1). Furthermore, this figure indicates that older children were
more likely to reject unequal offers than younger children. In
contrast, rejections of equal offers were low overall, and stable
across age groups. Indeed, our minimal model confirmed that
interaction between Age Group and Distribution was a significant
predictor of children’s decisions in the disadvantageous inequity
condition (LRT, X22 = 10.03, P = 0.007; see Table S3 for model
output).
Results for the advantageous inequity condition are shown in
Fig. 3b. As this figure illustrates, children rarely rejected unequal
offers that benefited them more (4–1). Indeed, neither Age Group
nor Distribution predicted rejections in our game. Our GLMM
analyses showed that a full model, including all predictors and
two-way interactions with Distribution, provided only a marginally
better fit to participants’ decision data than a null model that
included participant ID as the sole explanatory term (X29 = 16.51,
P = 0.057). This finding suggests that inter-individual variation
accounted for almost as much variation in participant behavior as
did predictor variables and participant ID combined.
Our minimal model showed that the only significant predictor
of children’s behavior was the order in which blocks of trials were
presented (LRT, X21 = 7.50, P = 0.006; see Table S3 for model
output). This order effect was due to the fact that children who
received the 4–1 block first rejected more trials overall (mean
rejections overall = 1.2, mean rejections of 1–1 = 1.4, mean
rejections of 4–1 = 1.0) compared to children who received the 1–
1 block first (mean rejections overall = .65, mean rejections of 1–1
= .66, mean rejections of 4–1 = .64).
We were interested in whether children’s decisions varied across
trials. To test this, we performed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on
participants’ first three unequal trials compared to their last three
unequal trials. We also examined whether participants’ decisions
about equal trials varied across trials using these same compar-
isons. Separate Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed for
each age group within each condition (see Fig. S3 for a graph
showing decisions over trials). In two cases, we found a significant
difference between the first and second block of three unequal
trials. Children in the 6&7-year-old age group were less likely to
reject disadvantageously unequal trials in the second group of
three trials compared to the first group of three trials (W = 833, P
= 0.030). Similarly, children in the 8&9-year-old age group were
less likely to reject disadvantageously unequal allocations in later
trials (W = 269.5, P = 0.049). None of the other comparisons
showed a significant difference between the first three and second
three trials (Ps . 0.2).
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 compared. To examine
whether children rejected more disadvantageous inequity and
advantageous inequity offers in the social version of the game (i.e.,
when they were paired with a partner) than the nonsocial game,
we compared results from Experiments 1 and 2. Figure 4a-d
illustrate children’s probability of rejection in the social and
nonsocial versions of the Inequity Game. Children’s rejections are
shown separately by condition and distribution to reflect our
method of analysis.
To address the question of whether rejections varied by social
context (i.e. Experiment 1 or Experiment 2), we conducted four
separate GLMMs that each tested whether participants’ decisions
were predicted by an interaction between Experiment (social, i.e.
Experiment 1 or nonsocial, i.e. Experiment 2) and Age group. For
the equal allocations, results from these models showed that
children’s rejections did not depend on social context (see Table
S4 for model output). The interaction between Age group and
Experiment was not significant for either the disadvantageous
inequity or advantageous inequity condition (disadvantageous
inequity: X22 = 4.05, P = 0.132; advantageous inequity: X
2
2 =
1.14, P = 0.566).
In contrast, for the unequal reward allocations, children’s
decisions did vary by experiment. The interaction between Age
group and Experiment was a significant predictor of children’s
decision in both the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous
inequity conditions (disadvantageous inequity: X22 = 30.03, P ,
0.001; advantageous inequity: X22 = 7.26, P = 0.027). Figure 4b
and 4d illustrate these interactions. In the disadvantageous
inequity condition, children in all age groups rejected unequal
allocations more often in the social than the nonsocial version of
the Inequity Game. In the advantageous inequity condition, 8&9-
year-old children rejected unequal offers (4–1) more often in the
social game than in the nonsocial game. However, 4&5- and 6&-7-
year-olds’ rejections of unequal reward allocations in the
advantageous inequity condition did not differ between social
and nonsocial contexts.
Discussion
There are three major findings from Experiment 2. First, 4- to
9-year-old children tended to reject disadvantageous inequity
allocations in a nonsocial situation. To our knowledge, this is the
first study to demonstrate that children will reject inequity in a
nonsocial version of a reward distribution game. Second, 4- to 9-
year-old children tended to reject disadvantageous inequity
significantly more often when they were playing with a social
partner than when they were playing the nonsocial game. Third,
whereas younger children accepted advantageous inequity alloca-
tions in both the nonsocial and the social versions of the game,
8&9-year-old children rejected advantageous allocations only
when they were paired with a social partner.
The fact that children in a nonsocial game often rejected
disadvantageous inequity allocations suggests that their rejections
in the social version of this game were not motivated purely by an
aversion to having a smaller payoff than a social partner (i.e.,
envy). Rather, in both nonsocial and social contexts, children may
have rejected disadvantageous inequity allocations in part because
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their payoff was relatively less than other potential payoffs.
Rejections of disadvantageous inequity allocations in a nonsocial
context are thus consistent with the Nonsocial Hypothesis that
inequity aversion is built on a heuristic for gauging the relative
value of one’s payoff compared to an expected payoff (e.g.
reference-dependence) [33–35,45]. In the disadvantageous ineq-
uity condition, children may have been comparing their alloca-
tions of Skittles to other available allocations (i.e. they are
comparing their single skittle to the possible allocation of four
Skittles) regardless of whether another individual was benefiting
from the differential payoff distribution. However, this reference-
dependence explanation cannot fully account for children’s
rejections in the social game because rejections were significantly
higher there than in the nonsocial version of the game. Thus,
nonsocial influences partially explain disadvantageous inequity
aversion in children, but the presence of a social partner increases
children’s aversion to disadvantageous reward distributions.
In contrast to the disadvantageous condition, results from the
advantageous inequity condition show that children only rejected
advantageous allocations when playing the social version of the
task: they accepted advantageous inequity allocations in the
nonsocial task. This highlights that advantageous inequity aversion
is a genuinely social phenomenon and cannot be explained by
nonsocial reference-dependence. Moreover, this finding provides
further evidence for the notion that disadvantageous inequity and
advantageous inequity aversion follow different developmental
pathways and hence may be underpinned by different psycholog-
ical mechanisms.
General Discussion
Combined, these two experiments provide a detailed picture of
how social influences affect children’s decisions about unequal
payoffs. Experiment 1 demonstrated that children were not using
Figure 3. Proportion of reward allocations rejected in Experiment 2, the nonsocial version of the Inequity Game. Rejections are shown
for the disadvantageous inequity condition (A) and the advantageous inequity condition (B). Participants were assigned either to the
disadvantageous inequity condition (N = 98) or to the advantageous inequity condition (N = 103). In the disadvantageous inequity condition,
participants received one piece of candy while either one piece (equal distribution) or four pieces (unequal distribution) were placed on the other
side of the apparatus. In the advantageous inequity condition, participants received either one piece of candy (equal distribution) or four pieces
(unequal distribution) while one piece was placed on the other side of the apparatus. In both the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous
inequity conditions, participants received six equal and six unequal trials. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966.g003
Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e80966
rejections as a means of eliciting more favorable distributions from
the experimenter and, thus, that the main social interaction in the
Inequity Game was between the decider and their social partner.
Experiment 2 showed that social partners influenced how children
reacted to inequity, although their importance varied depending
on the form of inequity. An aversion to advantageous inequity is
clearly a specifically social phenomenon; 8&9-year-old children
only rejected advantageous inequity when a partner was present.
Disadvantageous inequity aversion, on the other hand, has an
important nonsocial component; children in all age groups
rejected some disadvantageous inequity allocations in the absence
of a social partner. Importantly, however, disadvantageous
inequity aversion is influenced by social context; children rejected
more disadvantageous inequity allocations in the social game than
in the nonsocial game.
In Experiment 1, the experimenter’s intentional delivery of
unequal allocations had no effect on children’s decisions,
suggesting that the main social interaction in the task was between
decider and recipient rather than between the decider and
experimenter. Moreover, this demonstrates that rejections in the
Inequity Game were not attempts to influence the experimenter’s
reward allocations but were based instead on the relative rewards
at stake. Additionally, Experiment 1 provides an independent
replication of the age-shift reported in Blake and McAuliffe [14]
with 8&9-year-old children rejecting advantageous allocations
when playing the Inequity Game with a social partner.
The results of Experiment 2 provided support for the idea that
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion are support-
ed by two different cognitive processes [14,18]. Specifically, 8&9-
year-olds rejected advantageous offers only if there was a social
partner who would get less than them; children at this age
accepted advantageous offers in the nonsocial version. These
results are consistent with the idea that advantageous inequity
aversion evolved for social interactions and is not based on domain-
general mechanisms.
Figure 4. Proportions of reward allocations rejected in Experiments 1 (social) and 2 (nonsocial). Rejections are shown for the
disadvantageous inequity condition (A and B) and the advantageous inequity condition (C and D). Within condition, rejections are shown by equal
distribution (1–1, A and C) and unequal distribution (1–4 of 4–1, B and D). Participants were assigned either to the disadvantageous inequity
condition or to the advantageous inequity condition. Within condition, participants received six equal trials and six unequal trials. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080966.g004
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Results from the disadvantageous inequity conditions, on the
other hand, suggest that both social and nonsocial factors might
contribute to disadvantageous inequity aversion. In Experiment 2,
4- to 9-year-old children rejected disadvantageous inequity
allocations at significant levels even when no peer would receive
the larger reward. The fact that children in the nonsocial game
would rather have nothing than accept a relatively small reward
suggests that disadvantageous inequity aversion in children has an
important nonsocial component. This result is surprising in light of
work on adults where it is generally assumed that inequity aversion
is a specifically social phenomenon and, thus, nonsocial tests are
not typically conducted (see Sanfey et al. [36] for an exception).
Although there are clearly important social influences on
disadvantageous inequity aversion in children, disadvantageous
inequity aversion does not appear to be triggered exclusively by
interactions with a social partner. Rather, our results suggest that,
unlike advantageous inequity aversion, disadvantageous inequity
aversion may be built on a simpler domain-general process like
reference-dependence [33–35], which is consistent with the
Nonsocial Hypothesis for the evolution of inequity aversion.
Future work is necessary to understand the specific mechanisms
that underpin rejections of disadvantageous inequity allocations in
a nonsocial task, but, minimally, we can conclude from our results
that it may be necessary to revise the commonly held view that
individuals only reject disadvantageous allocations in order to
influence a partner’s payoff. Furthermore, our results suggest that
envy alone cannot account for rejections of disadvantageously
unequal allocations. More broadly, we argue that a productive
area for future work would be (1) to understand why advantageous
inequity aversion is specifically social while disadvantageous
inequity aversion is not and (2) to develop a theory for the
evolution of inequity aversion that can account for this important
dissociation by integrating the Social and Nonsocial hypotheses.
Such an approach will also be instrumental in creating ties
between studies of inequity across human adults, children and
nonhuman animals.
Rejections of unequal allocations in the nonsocial game
represent an intriguing similarity with nonhuman animal work
where individuals commonly reject inequitable allocations in
nonsocial controls [19–21,24–26]. While results from Experiment
2 cannot speak directly to the evolutionary origin of inequity
aversion in humans, they suggest at least two plausible explana-
tions. First, it is possible that inequity aversion is indeed a purely
social phenomenon in humans and rejections in the absence of a
social partner are a misapplication of this aversion. In line with this
hypothesis, children in our sample may have acquired an
expectation about equity in the social domain and have
erroneously applied this expectation to the nonsocial task.
Alternatively, inequity aversion in humans may be built on
domain-general mechanisms that are shared with nonhuman
species [34] and that is enhanced by social context. In line with
this view, children perceive their payoff of one Skittle as less
desirable when it is distributed alongside of a payoff of 4 Skittles
compared to when it is alongside of a payoff of 1 Skittle. Children
may react aversively to this payoff asymmetry regardless of
whether it is benefiting a peer, but their reactions to inequity are
strongest when a peer benefits from the asymmetry. At present, we
are unable to distinguish between these alternatives but view them
as fruitful areas for future inquiry.
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether the critical social
interaction in the Inequity Game is between decider and
experimenter or between decider and recipient. We tested this
by asking whether children were rejecting unequal allocations in
the Inequity Game in order to elicit more favorable distributions
from the experimenter. Results from this study show that deciders
did not distinguish between unequal allocations that were
deliberately versus randomly generated by the experimenter,
suggesting that children were most likely not attempting to
influence the experimenter with rejections. Further evidence in
support of the idea that children did not reject unequal
allocations in order to influence the experimenter comes from
the finding that there was a difference in levels of rejections in the
nonsocial and social versions of the Inequity Game. If children’s
rejections in the game were solely motivated by a desire to
influence the experimenter, we would not expect to see this
difference. Given these two lines of reasoning, we argue that the
relevant social interaction in the Inequity Game is between
decider and recipient and that children show high levels of
rejection in the social version of the Inequity Game, most likely
because they are attempting to affect their social partner’s payoff
through rejections.
More broadly, the results from Experiment 1 have important
methodological implications because they demonstrate that
children’s behavior in the Inequity Game is not driven by their
desire to influence the experimenter. Given that almost all studies
of inequity aversion in children are done in the presence of an
experimenter, this may help alleviate concerns about experimenter
effects and substantiate the interpretation that children’s decisions
in these tasks result from their interaction with a peer.
Social influences are undoubtedly important in the expression of
inequity aversion in children, and this is especially true for
advantageous inequity aversion. However, there are also impor-
tant nonsocial factors at play, as was evidenced by children’s
rejections of disadvantageous allocations in the nonsocial game.
Thus, our results begin to paint a more nuanced picture of the
emergence of inequity aversion in children. Understanding the
social factors that influence the expression of inequity aversion is
critical to understanding its evolution and development but, to
date, few studies have tested these influences empirically.
Examining the social factors that influence inequity aversion in
children and adults will help unite human inequity aversion studies
with inequity aversion studies in nonhuman animals and will help
shed light on the evolutionary and developmental processes that
shape inequity aversion in humans.
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